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Abstract: We analyze the political origins of differences in adherence to the fiscal framework of 
the European Union. We show how incentives to use fiscal policy for electoral purposes and 
limited budget transparency at the national level, combined with the need to respond to fiscal 
rules at the supranational level, interact to produce systematic undermining of the Economic and 
Monetary Union through employment of fiscal gimmicks or creative accounting. We also 
identify in detail how manipulation of national accounts was used to produce electoral cycles 
under the radar of the budget surveillance system of the EU, and conclude with new perspectives 
on the changes to and challenges for euro area fiscal rules.  
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The establishment of the euro, the common currency, followed fifty years of ever deeper 
European integration. It was initially seen as a success. In recent years, however, problems 
surrounding the euro have absorbed most of the energies of the European Union (EU).1 There 
were warnings that the risk of moral hazard in the form of imperfectly observable slack fiscal 
discipline meant that a common currency could not and would not function without strong 
coordination and centralization of national fiscal policies.2 Despite these, in the early stages of 
economic cooperation, member countries were reluctant to give up fiscal sovereignty. The EU 
instead devised an elaborate system of budget surveillance and fiscal rules, notably in the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty and 1997 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).3 As has become clear following 
the financial crisis, however, such rules and surveillance did not ensure sound public finances 
pre-crisis.  
We analyze the political origins of (non-)compliance with this fiscal framework, in the 
form of creative accounting or fiscal gimmickry, deviations from accepted and expected 
reporting practises. As an example of this, consider the 2002 Eurostat challenge to the 
Portuguese government who refused to provide information on some €7.4 billion of subsidies to 
seven public enterprises, including Metro Lisboa.4 By classifying subsidies granted on a regular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Frieden et al. 2012. Rogoff 2012 calls the euro a “grand experiment”. According to Feldstein 2012, it should “be 
recognized as […] failed”. 
2 See Inman and Rubinfeld 1994; Milesi-Ferretti 2004. Keohane 1984 considers international cooperation under 
imperfect information. 
3 The SGP’s fiscal rules limited annual general government deficits to 3% and debt to 60% of GDP in member 
states, with an elaborate system of statistical reporting and monitoring. See Savage 2005; Hallerberg et al. 2009. 
4 Savage, 2005, 162. 
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basis to cover accumulated losses as equity purchases, the government moved them “below the 
line”, outside the deficit, the key indicator whose size was governed by the SGP. 
We show that 
(1) despite reporting rules and an elaborate monitoring mechanism (including a 
common European statistical agency, Eurostat), compliance with the fiscal 
rules in the SGP was systematically undermined by political incentives 
resulting from the electoral cycle and the state of the economy; 
(2) under rules like these, the scale of gimmickry depends on the degree of fiscal 
transparency in the domestic budget process; 
(3) incentives for fiscal gimmickry grew with adoption of these fiscal rules, and 
tampering with accounting for subsidies was not the only way countries 
evaded the SGP and Eurostat supervision; 
(4) unlike a good deal of contemporary discussion, non-compliance with the SGP 
was not “all about Greece”. Greece was indeed an extreme case, the least 
transparent of the countries we study. However, the patterns we identify 
appear whether or not we include Greece in the data. 
In the Portuguese case above, 2002 was an election year. That is not a coincidence but 
part of a pattern in low transparency countries, where the extent of gimmickry reflects the need 
for political support in election years. Countries with higher fiscal transparency generally 
observed SGP requirements for fiscal reporting, though occasionally violating the deficit limits 
themselves. Also, when larger deficits loomed in an economic downturn, low transparency 
countries systematically circumvented the reporting rules with creative accounting. Our result – 
that despite common supra-national rules and monitoring, domestic institutions (budget 
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transparency), politics (elections), and economic cycles (recessions) explain much of the 
variation in outcomes – reinforces the argument that “the source of fiscal discipline is at the 
domestic level”.5  
More broadly, our findings have important implications for current and future attempts to 
reduce the risk of strategic behaviour with elements of moral hazard on the part of euro member 
countries. The conditioning role of transparency reveals limits on the effectiveness and 
credibility of centralized monitoring and enforcement regimes in treaty organizations.6 In 
particular, this means that asymmetric information in an economic union is not only of academic 
interest, but has serious, real-world consequences for sustaining cooperation among national 
governments. Moreover, stricter fiscal rules without increased observability of actions and 
outcomes, let alone rules whose complexity decreases observability, will not improve the 
situation. Thus, our findings raise doubts about the effectiveness of the 2012 Fiscal Compact. We 
return to this point in the conclusion. 
First we define gimmicks and review the theory examining their relationships with rules, 
transparency, electoral timing, and the business cycle. We extract data from detailed government 
accounts to show how gimmicks were achieved in practice and, thus, where to look for them in 
the future. We then describe explanatory data, specification, and estimates. Finally, we discuss 
policy implications. 
Theory and measurement of gimmicks 
Originally, according to Webster’s, “gimmick” was a slang term for something that a con artist 
or magician had his assistant manipulate to make appearances different from reality. It retains 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Hallerberg 2004, 220-1. 
6 Dai 2002; on international scrutiny see Hyde and O’Mahony 2010. 
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that meaning in the fiscal context. Gimmicks are a variety of more or less deliberate attempts by 
governments to improve the appearance of their public finance statistics (like budget balance and 
debt) through actions that have no substantive effect on their real underlying fiscal position. The 
root of the problem is asymmetric information in fiscal/economic unions. When governments 
can misreport fiscal data, fiscal rules increase the potential for moral hazard, or “hidden actions” 
like gimmicks that involve creative or unorthodox accounting treatments of operations to 
interpret rules in a favorable way, or, occasionally, cheating.7 Appendix 1 reviews existing 
literature and ways to measure gimmickry. 
Why would governments choose to misrepresent the state of their public finances? Euro 
member countries generally face three audiences: domestic voters, bond markets, and the EU 
itself. Conceptually, countries projecting deficits or debt levels that violate the SGP rules can – 
for a given level of budget transparency – do three things. Each involves a different tradeoff. 
They can observe the fiscal rules and make real adjustments to tax and expenditure levels. This 
will placate bond markets and Eurostat, but be costly if the resulting policies are unpopular with 
voters at the national level. Or, they can forego fiscal consolidation, break the rules outright, and 
post deficits and debts in excess of the thresholds mandated by the SGP. This also can come at a 
price. In the run-up, Greece’s entry into the common currency was delayed due to too-high 
deficits and, once the euro existed, the system had penalties making it costly for countries to 
violate the rules. Or, finally, countries can resort to gimmickry, leaving real outcomes, especially 
spending, unchanged.8 Voters are unharmed in the short run, and gimmicks fool bond markets 
and supranational authorities to the extent they are undetected. Here the tradeoff is inter-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Koen and van den Noord 2005; Irwin 2012. 
8 Milesi-Ferretti 2004. 
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temporal: if undetected, gimmickry keeps governments on good terms with everyone in the 
present, but may entail considerable costs if deficits and debts accumulate, later, in the form of 
high bond yields and even political unrest. Strategic choice could involve more than one of these 
avenues for action. 
These trade-offs assume a given level of visibility or transparency, outside the scope of 
policy-making, at least in the short-term. If countries face costly constraints, either politically, 
from voters, or economically, from supranational fiscal rules or markets, why would countries 
not simply reduce transparency in order to facilitate fiscal gimmickry? They could, but changing 
governance structures like transparency downwards is visible, carries substantial reputational 
costs, and, in our context, is penalized by bond markets.9 When Romania (not in our sample) 
recently decriminalized legislative corruption there were fierce protests from the international 
community, including the EU.10 Moreover, changing transparency happens infrequently: the 
longest time-series of institutional budget transparency reveals that across nine indicators about 
one change per U.S. state occurs every fifteen years, rarely downwards.11 For four countries in 
our sample with repeat assessments between 2006 and 2010, the Open Budget Index 
transparency measure (OBI, details in Appendix 2) reports no significant changes or reordering 
of the ranking.12 
 Bond market pressure was absent before the financial crisis, as the essentially full 
convergence of Eurozone government bond yields shows (see Appendix 3). Consequently, we 
focus on one strategy, which combines rule violation and gimmickry with absence of market 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Glennerster and Shin 2008. 10	  http://euobserver.com/justice/122424	  
11	  Alt	  et	  al.	  2006.	  
12 International Budget Partnership 2010, 37-45.  
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discipline and no changes in transparency. But how can we make gimmickry observable and 
quantified when the point of misrepresenting fiscal quantities is to avoid detection? We next 
show how gimmickry can be inferred from traces left in the national accounts, even after 
Eurostat scrutiny. 
 Measuring gimmickry: stock-flow adjustments. One measure of gimmickry, reasonably 
well-known to practitioners, is the “stock-flow adjustment” (SFA).13 The SFA is a statistical 
residual, an accounting item defined so as to reconcile the difference between a change in the 
government’s debt (the total face value of the “debt-like” or “fixed” claims held against them) 
and budget deficit (the excess of spending over revenue). Thus, in year t it is defined as 
, where the first two terms are the annual change in gross debt D and B is 
the budget balance, expressing a deficit as a negative number. Since on average an increasing 
deficit would increase debt, a positive SFA indicates that the change in gross debt exceeds the 
magnitude of the budget deficit (or decreases by less than a surplus). For instance, if debt 
outstanding increases by 4 and the balance is reported as -2 (a deficit), then the above expression 
yields an SFA of 2. A surplus of 2 that resulted in no debt reduction gives the same result. A 
negative SFA implies that government debt increases by less than the size of the deficit. 
 Deficit figures can be manipulated in many ways. A familiar one, like the Portuguese 
example in the introduction, involves reclassifying a subsidy as an equity purchase, not counted 
as expenditure in calculating the deficit. But if it is debt-funded, the SFA increases, indicating 
misreporting. Indeed, despite the EU’s well-known emphasis on deficit limits, many countries 
had sustained positive SFAs after the euro formed. But some positive SFAs are legitimate, for 
example if they reflect the systematic net acquisition by the government of financial assets, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 von Hagen and Wolff 2006. 
1t t t tSFA D D B−= − +
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foreign-currency debt appreciation due to exchange rate movements. Negative SFAs, if a 
gimmick, could indicate attempting to stay below a debt limit while not broaching a deficit limit. 
After 1997 no country in our sample ran substantial negative SFAs on average, though several 
did so before then (see Appendix 4, Figure A.3). That needs to be explained, since differences 
between deficit and debt changes may be unavoidable: but over time, if random, positive and 
negative would even out.  
Hands on the lever: SFA components. To see deeper into the manipulation, and avoid 
some ambiguities of the SFA, we disaggregate the SFA into its accounting components.14 Our 
empirical results suggest two components as important and plausible sources of gimmicks: the 
net acquisition of “shares and other equity” and an item called “net incurrence of other 
liabilities” that captures mainly “other accounts payable”. Each is aggregated into the SFA along 
with other components listed in Appendix 4.  
Again, “shares and other equity” transactions become gimmicks when, for instance, 
payments to cover recurring losses by a state-owned company are treated as equity purchases 
instead of current transfers. Analyzing the component instead of the SFA strips out the 
possibility of confounding with the accumulation of other types of financial assets that also 
appear in the SFA. “Other accounts payable” (OAP) covers a variety of goods and services 
delivered but not yet paid for. With cash accounting, the accumulation of arrears like these can 
make the deficit look better. With the EU’s system of accrual accounting this can be achieved 
through under-recording at the time of delivery, which has the effect of reducing the reported 
deficit without causing a corresponding reduction in debt (if the bills are actually paid). That 
shows up as an irregularity in the annual change of OAP: the SFA increases with a negative net 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Seiferling 2013. 
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change in OAP. For example, a 2004 audit by Eurostat uncovered such under-recording of 
military expenditures in Greece for several years previous. Full details and references are in 
Appendix 4, while exact data sources are presented in Appendix 5. 
Explaining gimmicks 
Are there factors that systematically explain recourse to gimmicks? What are they? Are their 
effects conditional on the extent of transparency? Ultimately, was Greece a special case, or just 
an extreme example of systematic patterns that exist elsewhere? 
Budget transparency. Gimmicks reflect government decisions to misrepresent fiscal 
quantities. Such choices are constrained by but analytically distinguishable from budget 
transparency, a characteristic of the institutional framework for budgetary reporting, including 
accounting systems and standards. Budget transparency affects how easy it is for auditors, 
markets, and the public to see through gimmicks. More transparent institutions increase the 
probability of detection and so reduce the appeal of gimmicks.15  
How does one measure budget transparency? The OECD defines it as “the full disclosure 
of all relevant fiscal information in a timely and systematic manner”.16 This includes, for 
instance, an executive budget proposal with comprehensive expenditure and revenue figures and 
medium-term estimates; performance data; analysis of fiscal risks like deviations from key 
assumptions; in-year implementation updates; and reliable annual accounts that are 
independently audited. We aggregate these items into an index.17 It correlates from .66 to .80 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Alesina and Perotti 1996. 
16 OECD 2002, 7. 
17 Initially developed by Alt and Lassen 2006a, 2006b and later revised by Lassen 2010. 
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with later indices from the International Budget Partnership and the IMF. Data, imputation, and 
transparency scores appear in Appendix 2.  
Other explanatory variables. The main explanatory variables are fiscal rules, electoral 
incentives, and economic conditions. The fiscal rules in the SGP, a 3% limit on the government 
deficit and a 60% cap on the government debt to GDP ratio, were in effect from 1998 on. We 
expect these rules to create larger gimmicks. A government’s electoral incentives are captured 
by years left in the term of office, ending in zero in the election year: there should be more 
gimmickry when fewer years are left. We distinguish years of fast growth (boom) from below-
trend growth (slump), as explained in Appendix 6: we expect more gimmicks during slumps.  
Specification and estimation results.  Our principal specification is for 14 EU countries 
for 1990-2007.18 We regress fiscal gimmickry on the explanatory variables described above, and 
their interactions with budget transparency. If the effects of rules, elections, and economic 
conditions are conditional on fiscal transparency, higher transparency should displace the 
incentives to manipulate public finances.19 Figure 1 reports the main results. It plots marginal 
effects of each explanatory variable for the sample range of budget transparency and 10% 
confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by country. It distinguishes estimates 
obtained with samples including Greece (plotted in grey) and excluding it (red). The logic of our 
approach is that if the SFA contains gimmicks, we should be able to identify plausible 
components of this residual whose patterns match those found for the SFA and whose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Luxembourg lacks  transparency data. Results for components cover the six countries reported by Eurostat. 
19 We control for banking crises, which can affect governments’ use of asset purchases and loans to the private 
sector. See Weber 2012. Our fiscal transparency measure is time invariant, hence it is subsumed in a country’s fixed 
effect. We also include year fixed effects. We drop one year to accommodate estimating the SGP coefficient. 
! 10 
magnitudes exhaust the estimated SFA patterns. Full regression results, with other explanatory 
variables and codings are described in detail in Appendices 7 and 8.
! 11 
Figure 1: The determinants of stock-flow adjustments conditional on budget transparency 
 
Notes: Red lines display results obtained with samples that exclude Greece; grey lines show results with the full 14-country sample. Panels (a), (d), (e) and (f) 
report results from columns (3) and (4) in Table A.3 in Appendix 7. The thin grey lines report the conditional coefficients (solid) and associated 10% confidence 
intervals (dashed) based on results with the full sample in column (3). The thicker red lines report the conditional coefficients based on the results in column (4), 
where Greece is excluded from the sample. The red dot in panel (a) shows the coefficient projected from the results with the reduced sample for a country with 
Greece’s level of budget transparency. Panels (b) and (c) are based, respectively, on the results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1. Since data for these 
subcomponents are not available for Greece, as well as other countries, panels (b) and (c) report only a single result each. 
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Panel (a) clearly reveals an electoral cycle in gimmicks, conditional on transparency. 
Each additional year left in the electoral term is estimated to reduce the SFA by one percent of 
GDP if a country has Greece’s level of budget transparency. But increasing transparency reduces 
or eliminates the electoral cycle. Excluding Greece from the sample, the estimate for the lowest 
observed level of transparency (Italy and Portugal’s) is about half that size. Using Eurostat data 
for 2002 GDP at market prices, this is equivalent to 747 million Euro for Portugal (.53% of 141 
billion) and 6.9 billion Euro for Italy (.53% of 1.3 trillion). By contrast, if in 2002 Portugal had 
had two additional years left in the electoral term, we estimate that the SFA would have been 1.5 
billion Euro (over 1% of GDP) lower. This behavior thus turns out to be a substantial regularity 
we detect. And it is still there: Eurostat argued with Ireland about this in 2011, another election 
year though outside our estimation period (see Appendix 3). 
What produced this pattern? Abuse of accounting for subsidies as equity purchases and, 
to a lesser extent, under-recording of deliveries stand out among all the SFA components we 
reviewed, as shown in panels (b) and (c). In our sample period Eurostat did not report 
components data for Greece. Moreover, the sum of predictions from these two components is 
about equal to the prediction for whole SFA. The joint marginal effect of these two components, 
at Portugal’s level of fiscal transparency, amounts to .6% of GDP, providing a 20% cushion on 
the 3% deficit-to-GDP limit. This is likely to be a lower bound, since our fiscal data already 
include a number of revisions undertaken by Eurostat after their initial release, whose likelihood 
is apparently also related to elections.20 As far as we can tell, these components are “where the 
action is”. As elections approach, gimmicks increase, but where institutions make discovery 
easier and more likely, the electoral benefits of gimmickry diminish and ultimately disappear.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See de Castro et al. 2011. But they do not estimate magnitudes of any predicted effects. 
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Panel (d) shows that, again in low-transparency environments, the SGP increased the 
SFA.21 Further analysis in Appendix 7 suggests that the misuse of equity injections to disguise 
subsidies and thus deficits, via the SFA, was significant after the imposition of the SGP. Once 
again, this effect is absent where fiscal transparency is greater. However, reading across the 
panel from left to right, the SGP had a significant effect only at levels of transparency like those 
of Greece (minimal), where it induced an increase in SFAs of four percentage points of GDP, 
equivalent to 6.6 billion Euro in 2002 (4.19 percent of 157 billion). Data omitting Greece 
produces a similar estimate. Greece was not a special case but rather was the extreme case of a 
general, and comprehensible, pattern: that is what these results show. 
  Fiscal transparency also affects the response to business cycle movements.22 Low-
transparency countries, but not those with high transparency, make more use of SFAs in slumps, 
as panel (e) shows. In contrast, panel (f) shows that booms have no significant effects. Finally, 
Appendix 8 presents estimates with different measurements and coding of rules, transparency, 
and other variables, varied samples, and including a lagged dependent variable. Those tests 
qualitatively support our main results: the presence of an electoral cycle in gimmicks, more 
pressure from hard times, recourse to gimmicks exacerbated by rules, all conditional on limited 
transparency. They confirm that gimmicks were used in this period to manipulate deficits relative 
to debt. No results cause us to believe we have omitted important variables. 
Implications 
With asymmetric information about fiscal policy behavior, domestic pressures exacerbate moral 
hazard. In democracies, even advanced ones, incentives for politicians to employ gimmicks get 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This confirms predications by Milesi-Ferretti 2004. 
22 See Lassen 2010 on transparency and fiscal consolidations. 
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stronger when elections approach. Moreover, supranational fiscal rules meant to sustain 
cooperation instead exacerbate incentives for national governments to resort to gimmickry, to 
manipulate reported data, rather than fix fiscal policy. These are not the actions of any single 
country, but systematic tendencies. Budget process transparency can reduce these incentives to 
manipulate, even those that would otherwise intensify in times of economic stress. Warnings 
raised in policy and research papers since the early 1990s about risks of moral hazard in 
economic policy making for countries in economic unions remain a concern. 
It seems an inescapable implication that attempts at fiscal policy coordination in 
economic unions will struggle, even fail, in non-transparent environments. The 2012 Fiscal 
Compact adopted by most EU countries emphasizes complex “second generation” fiscal rules 
based on structural indicators.23 These are notoriously subject to differing interpretations and 
different methods of calculation.24 This approach is especially worrying given the tremendous 
difficulties the EU encountered in monitoring and attempting to enforce a seemingly simple 3% 
deficit limit, and it makes fiscal transparency even more essential. Moreover, the Compact yet 
again places more emphasis on the deficit than the stock of debt: article 3(2) requires countries to 
incorporate into national law the structural balance rule but not limits on debt. Without major 
improvements in fiscal transparency, our findings suggest, this approach may not bring about the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Article 3 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union requires 
the general government balance of a of a signatory country to be “balanced or in surplus”, defined with reference to 
its country-specific medium-term objective under the revised SGP, and imposes “a lower limit of a structural deficit 
of 0.5% of the gross domestic product at market prices”. 
24 See The Economist, December 10, 2011. The German federal government thought the output gap negative in 
2011, while the Bundesbank thought it positive. McArdle 2012 notes that the EU’s 2008 estimate for the Irish output 
gap was 0.2%, since revised to -4.0%, with an impact on the structural budget of -1.7%. 
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budgetary discipline sought by the designers of the Compact. Indeed, the structural balance rule 
could instead turn out to be counter-productive. 
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Appendix 1. Literature: theory and measurement  
 The theoretical problem we analyze is asymmetric information in 
fiscal/economic unions. Beetsma and Jensen1 consider moral hazard under a stability pact 
while Persson and Tabellini2 investigate insurance in a federation with unverifiable 
shocks. The broad policy debate preceding the SGP produced a number of policy papers 
on moral hazard in a potential Eurozone, including Inman and Rubinfeld.3 Clearly, the 
concern was out there but empirically it was not often addressed, though some studies 
investigate whether the SGP affected fiscal gimmickry.4  
Milesi-Ferretti5 examines theoretically the effect of fiscal rules when governments 
have the possibility to misreport fiscal data and proposes: “For a given cost of violating 
the rule, the size of fiscal adjustment induced by the rule is increasing in the degree of 
transparency of the budget.” Beetsma and Bovenberg’s6 conclusion from their theoretical 
analysis is that in fiscal unions “moral hazard due to international transfers seems to be a 
potentially important issue because of lack of transparency of budgeting processes … 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Roel Beetsma and Henrik Jensen, ‘Contingent Deficit Sanctions and Moral Hazard With a Stability Pact’, 
Journal of International Economics, 61 (2003), pp. 187-208. 
2 Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, ‘Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard’, 
Econometrica 64 (1996), pp. 623-46. 
3 Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, ‘The EMU and Fiscal Policy in the New European Community: 
An Issue for Economic Federalism’, International Review of Law and Economics 14 (1994), pp. 147-61. 
4 See Vincent Koen and Paul van den Noord. ‘Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe: One-Off Measures and 
Creative Accounting’, OECD Economics Department Working Paper 417 (2005); Marco Buti, João N. 
Martin and Alessandro Turrini, ‘From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical 
Fiscal Rules’, CESifo Economic Studies, 53 (2007), pp. 115-52; Jürgen von Hagen and Guntram B. Wolff, 
‘What Do Deficits Tell Us About Debt? Empirical Evidence on Creative Accounting With Fiscal Rules in 
the EU’, Journal of Banking and Finance 30 (2006), pp. 3259-79. 
5 Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti, ‘Good, Bad or Ugly? On the Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative 
Accounting’, Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004), p. 383. 
6 Roel Beetsma and A. Lans Bovenberg, ‘The Optimality of a Monetary Union without a Fiscal Union’, 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 33 (2001), p. 203. 
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[that] contributes also to political distortions weakening fiscal discipline.” Milesi-
Ferretti’s theoretical idea has been widely accepted, but largely ignored in the political 
economy empirical literature.7 
 Budget transparency is a characteristic of institutions. Gimmicks are government 
decisions to misrepresent fiscal quantities. According to Koen and van den Noord, they 
include both “one-off”, non-recurring practices like the privatization of real assets, tax 
amnesties, or the acceleration of tax intakes and “creative” or unorthodox accounting 
treatment of operations, reflecting strategic choices about particular transactions that 
interpret rules in a favorable way, or, occasionally, downright cheating. Such practices 
are analytically distinguishable from the institutional framework for budgetary reporting, 
including accounting systems and standards.  
 Budget transparency sets the likely cost or probability of detection of resorting to 
gimmicks. Some studies provide evidence that upcoming elections increase a 
government’s incentives to improve the appearance of deficits. Buti et al.8 find that 
elections increase gimmicks, although the estimate is not very precise. Looking at 
revisions, de Castro et al.9 find that pre-election years in particular increase the likelihood 
that a published deficit figure subsequently will be revised upward. The literature on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Maria Eslava, ‘The Political Economy of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey’, Journal of Economic Surveys 25 
(2011), pp. 645-73. Anke Weber, ‘Stock-Flow Adjustments and Fiscal Transparency: A Cross-Country 
Comparison’, IMF Working Paper WP/12/39 (2012) finds a negative relationship between the level of 
transparency and stock-flow adjustments in a panel of 122 countries between 1980 and 2010, but does not 
consider the interaction between fiscal transparency and fiscal rules central to Milesi-Ferretti’s analysis.  
8 Buti et al., ‘From Deficits to Debt and Back’. 
9 Francisco de Castro, Javier J. Pérez, and Marta Rodríguez-Vives, ‘Fiscal Data Revisions in Europe’, 
European Central Bank Working Paper 1342 (2011). 
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forecasting in EU countries contains similar findings;10 however, none of this work 
conditions estimates on the transparency of budgetary practices. 
 Economic and fiscal conditions, too, may play a role in explaining the use of 
fiscal gimmicks. The IMF11 warned that, in the wake of the global economic crisis, 
governments “may be tempted to supplement genuine fiscal adjustment with accounting 
stratagems.” As above, von Hagen and Wolff find that especially the cyclical part of 
deficits tends to be offset by gimmicks. Thus, there is limited evidence that rules, 
electoral cycles, and output shocks all create incentives for gimmickry. Their effects 
should be estimated simultaneously in a multivariate model, with interactions between 
these variables and budget transparency to estimate the conditioning effect of the latter. 
This is the basis of our empirical specification. 
 Our dependent variable of choice is the stock-flow adjustment, presented in detail 
in the main text. There are other ways to approach gimmickry. Easterly12 argues that 
“[f]iscal adjustment is an illusion when it lowers the budget deficit or public debt but 
leaves government net worth unchanged.” Net worth is the difference between (financial 
plus non-financial) assets and liabilities, with “structural” implications for future 
taxation.13 Net acquisition of assets and the net incurrence of liabilities are aggregates of 
the detail coding we employ below, and are consistent with our approach. Another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Tilman Brück and Andreas Stephan, ‘Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit 
Forecasts?’, Kyklos 59 (2006), pp. 3-15. 
11 International Monetary Fund [IMF], ‘Shifting Gears: Tackling Challenges on the Road to Fiscal 
Adjustment’, Fiscal Monitor (April 2011), p. 73. 
12 William Easterly, ‘When is Fiscal Adjustment an Illusion?’, Economic Policy 14 (1999), p. 57. 
13 Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Kenji Moriyama, ‘Fiscal Adjustment in EU Countries: A Balance Sheet 
Approach’, Journal of Banking and Finance 30 (2006), pp. 3281-98. 
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alternative is the aggregation of “bottom-up” identification of individual incidents.14 
Koen and van den Noord identify a total of 206 one-off transactions, creative accounting 
operations, and classification errors for 15 EU countries between 1993 and 2003, some of 
which span a number of years.15 Some, like those described in our paper (see also 
Appendix 4), affect SFAs while others are legitimate but “one-off” measures that 
temporarily improve deficits without affecting SFAs. These include tax amnesties and 
above-the-line privatizations. Since they capture detected fiscal gimmickry, the 
transactions they identify may already be reclassified and purged from the data we use.  
Finally, others exploit multiple vintages of fiscal data for the same period to 
capture (multiple) revisions or implementation errors. de Castro et al. examine decisions 
issued by the EU’s statistical agency, Eurostat, under the SGP. These consistently result 
in upward revision of deficit figures.16 It is not clear a priori whether different types of 
gimmickry are complements, with governments employing many different types of 
gimmickry at the same time, or substitutes, with governments favoring one instrument 
over others. Thus, it is unclear whether one would expect positive or negative 
correlations between different measures.17  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Bernard Dafflon and Sergio Rossi, ‘Public Accounting Fudges Towards EMU: A First Empirical 
Survey and Some Public Choice Considerations’, Public Choice 101 (1999), pp. 59-84. 
15 Greece accounts for about one quarter of the incidents they identify, and Italy for about one sixth. The 
quantitative estimates for some countries are also substantial, with annual deficit manipulation averages of 
about 2% of GDP in Greece, and two-thirds of a percent in Italy and Portugal. For two countries (France 
and Italy), Dafflon and Rossi estimate an aggregate impact on the 1997 deficit-to-GDP ratio of about three-
quarters of a percent. 
16 de Castro et al., ‘Fiscal Data Revisions in Europe’, p. 24. 
17 Anna M. Costello, Reining Petacchi and Joseph Weber, ‘The Hidden Consequences of Balanced Budget 
Requirements’ (Manuscript, Sloan School of Management, MIT, September 2012), analyze how US state 
governments meet balanced budget constraints with two key instruments, asset sales and accounting 
discretion. They conclude that their use correlates negatively and thus that they are substitutes. 
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Appendix 2. Measuring budget transparency 
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development defines budget 
transparency as “the full disclosure of all relevant fiscal information in a timely and 
systematic manner”18. This requires, amongst others, an executive budget proposal with 
comprehensive expenditure and revenue figures and medium-term estimates; 
performance data; analysis of fiscal risks like deviations from key assumptions; in-year 
implementation updates; and reliable annual accounts that are independently audited. 
 The IMF and the OECD19 have adopted standards for budget transparency that are 
reflected in several measurement efforts. One is an 11-item index initially developed by 
Alt and Lassen20 and later revised.21 Since 2006, the International Budget Partnership, an 
independent think tank, publishes the Open Budget Index (OBI). This 92-item measure 
captures the public availability of fiscal information across eight types of budget 
documents very similar to those recommended by the OECD and the IMF.22 In addition, 
the IMF has measured fiscal transparency on the basis of country assessments for the 
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes initiative. Table A.1 shows that these 
measures for countries in our sample reflect broadly similar patterns: the OBI is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], ‘OECD Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency’, OECD Journal on Budgeting 1 (2002), p. 7. 
19 For IMF see: International Monetary Fund [IMF], Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency 
(Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 1998); and George Kopits and J. D. Craig, 
‘Transparency in Government Operations’, IMF Occasional Paper 158 (1998). For OECD, see op.cit. 
20 James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen, ‘Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt in OECD 
Countries’, European Economic Review 50 (2006), pp. 1403-39. 
21 David Dreyer Lassen, Fiscal Consolidations in Advanced Industrialized Democracies: Economics, 
Politics, and Governance (Stockholm: Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, 2010). 
22 International Budget Partnership, Open Budgets. Transform Lives: The Open Budget Survey 2010 
(Washington, D. C.: International Budget Partnership, 2010). 
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positively correlated with the Alt-Lassen index (.69), its revised version (.80), and the 
IMF index (.66).  
Available measures cover similar aspects:23 For example, the OBI focuses on 
public availability of a list of key budget documents: a pre-budget statement, which 
presents the assumptions used in developing the budget; the executive’s budget proposal; 
the enacted budget; monthly or quarterly in-year implementation updates; a mid-year 
review; a year-end report; an annual audit report by an independent audit body; as well as 
a “citizens budget” that makes the budget accessible for a broad audience. This list is 
very similar to the documents propagated by the OECD and the IMF. The items covered 
by Alt and Lassen also relate very closely to these documents, and form part of the 
assessment in the IMF and OBI measures. For example, Alt and Lassen assess whether 
the budget proposal contains medium-term estimates, non-financial performance data, 
and information on fiscal risks such as changes in key economic assumptions and 
contingent liabilities. Other items relate to the quality of in-year reporting and 
government accounts. 
 None of the measures are available for the entire time period covered in this 
sample. The Alt and Lassen index is based on data collected in 1999, while the IMF 
index is based on assessments that are carried out at different points in time that span 
more than a decade. The OBI publishes a new set of results every two years, but only 
since 2006. Hence, for the purposes of this study, transparency is a static or slowly 
changing country characteristic. Evidence from US states suggests that this is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Joachim Wehner and Paolo de Renzio, ‘Citizens, Legislators, and Executive Disclosure: The 
Political Determinants of Fiscal Transparency’, World Development 41 (2013), pp. 96-108. 
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reasonable assumption.24 For the countries in our sample, the OBI reveals only minor 
changes from 2006 to 2012, no significant reordering of countries, and (marginally) 
decreasing transparency in only one country, France.25 In future years, as additional 
waves of the OBI become available, it will be possible to explore the evolution of fiscal 
transparency across countries. 
 Each of the measures has advantages and disadvantages. The Alt and Lassen 
index is easy to grasp and produces plausible results. However, in the context of this 
sample, it lacks granularity, as most countries score either a 3 or a 4. The IMF’s index is 
problematic for several reasons. First, countries themselves report most of the data, with 
little independent verification. Moreover, the IMF needs countries to agree to their 
assessment and the publication of the results. The OBI has none of these drawbacks. It is 
assembled by an independent think tank and subjected to peer review prior to publication. 
It also produces a reasonable range of aggregate scores that allows differentiation in this 
sample of countries. Unfortunately, the OBI only includes results for about half of the 
current EU member states. 
 To overcome these problems, we employ regression-based interpolation. We 
regress the OBI, rescaled to a theoretical range between zero and 1, onto a similarly 
rescaled version of the revised Alt and Lassen index. In addition, we regress the rescaled 
OBI onto the IMF transparency score. We then combine the results as follows: First, we 
take the rescaled OBI results for those countries where they are available. Second, 
missing values are replaced by the predicted values from the regression with the IMF 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen and Shanna Rose, ‘The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence 
from the US States’, IMF Staff Papers 53 (2006), pp. 30-57. 
25 See chapter 3 in International Budget Partnership, Open Budgets. Transform Lives: The Open Budget 
Survey 2012 (Washington, D. C.: International Budget Partnership, 2012). 
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index, if the latter are available. Third, any remaining missing values are replaced by the 
predicted values from the regression with the revised Alt and Lassen index. The resulting 
interpolated scores are displayed in the second-to-last column of Table A.1, which ranks 
countries in descending order on the basis of this score; see also Figure A.1. The only two 
countries for which no data are available on this measure are Luxembourg and Malta, the 
smallest two EU member states measured by population. 
For robustness, we carry out an alternative imputation of transparency using 
Amelia.26 To provide some cross-country and cross-year variation, we used transparency 
measured based on OBI as above, but since Amelia does not constrain all countries to 
have the same value across all years, there is temporal variation for the countries with 
imputed transparency data. Data was imputed for one year, repeated for all years 1990-
2007, using data for all available years for all other variables in the model, plus the EC 
fiscal rules index, the IMF data on national fiscal rules,27 as well as the other 
transparency measures in Table A.1. A third order time trend is included and is allowed 
to vary across countries. The final column of Table A.1 lists the median values of 
imputed transparency for the simulated datasets Amelia created. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 James Honaker, Gary King, and Matthew Blackwell, ‘Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data’, Journal 
of Statistical Software 45 (2011), pp. 1-24. 
27 See European Commission, Fiscal Rules Database (Brussels: European Commission, 2011); and 
Manmohan Kumar, Emanuele Baldacci, Andrea Schaechter, Carlos Caceres, Daehaeng Kim, Xavier 
Debrun, Julio Escolano, Jiri Jonas, Philippe Karam, Irina Yakadina and Robert Zymek, Fiscal Rules - 
Anchoring Expectations for Sustainable Public Finances (Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund, 
2009). See above for full details on index construction. 
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Table A.1.  Available measures of fiscal transparency for 27 EU countries 
 Alt-Lassen Lassen  OBI IMF Interpolated Amelia 
France 4 4 87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
United Kingdom 7 8 87 0.81 0.87 0.87 
Sweden 4 5 83 0.90 0.83 0.83 
Netherlands 5 5  0.88 0.78 0.69 
Finland 4 5   0.75 0.69 
Austria 4 4   0.71 0.67 
Slovenia   70 0.65 0.70 0.70 
Belgium 3 3   0.68 0.67 
Germany 2 3 68 0.82 0.68 0.68 
Denmark 3 3   0.68 0.69 
Ireland 3 3   0.68 0.68 
Estonia    0.71 0.66 0.69 
Poland   64 0.54 0.64 0.64 
Spain  3 63 0.70 0.63 0.63 
Czech Republic   62 0.61 0.62 0.62 
Italy 3 2 58 0.79 0.58 0.58 
Portugal  4 58 0.68 0.58 0.58 
Slovakia   57 0.73 0.57 0.57 
Bulgaria   56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Hungary    0.57 0.55 0.68 
Romania    0.55 0.54 0.66 
Latvia    0.51 0.51 0.67 
Greece  1 50 0.66 0.50 0.50 
Lithuania    0.50 0.50 0.67 
Cyprus    0.43 0.46 0.67 
Luxembourg      0.68 
Malta      0.68 
Notes: The theoretical range is zero to 11 for the Alt and Lassen index, while the OBI and IMF measures are standardized 
to range from zero to 100 and zero to one, respectively. There are no data for Luxembourg and Malta. The OBI score for 
Greece is not part of the original results but calculated by Andrianaki28 following the OBI methodology. Countries are 
ranked by their score on the interpolated measure and in descending order.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Fryni Andrianaki, Budget Transparency in Greece (Manuscript, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009). 
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Figure A.1.  Imputed measure of budget transparency, 25 EU countries 
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Appendix 3. Bond yields in the Eurozone area 
Both the European Commission and the IMF have cautioned that “large and persistent” 
SFAs may indicate “inappropriate recording of budgetary operations” and can lead to 
potentially large “ex post upward revisions of deficit levels”.29 The IMF notes that the 
increase in public debt stocks exceeded accumulated deficits over 1980-2010 in as many 
as 29 of 34 advanced economies.  
For Eurozone countries, this was made easier in the period we study because bond yields 
of differentially risky countries were harmonized in markets, as seen from Figure A.2, as 
though default was everywhere equally likely (before 2007, our data period), with a lack 
of market discipline resulting. On the other hand, once repeated revisions of deficit 
figures (as in Greece in 2009, after our estimation period) became familiar stories on 
newswires, bond yield diverged. 
Figure A.2.  Government benchmark yields, selected Eurozone countries, 2000-2013 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 European Commission, Public Finances in EMU 2003 (Brussels: European Commission, 2003), p. 82; 
International Monetary Fund [IMF], ‘Addressing Fiscal Challenges to Reduce Economic Risks’, Fiscal 
Monitor (September 2011), p. 51. 
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Appendix 4. Dependent variables: stock-flow adjustment and its components 
To construct measures of SFAs, we need comparable and accurate information on annual 
deficits and changes in debt for general government. We use the European Commission’s 
AMECO database. It includes all relevant information for the EU27-countries as well as 
most industrialized democracies and is the basis for the Commission’s policy work. Exact 
data sources are presented below. 
Figure A.3 shows cumulative deficits and debt change for 15 EU countries for the 
period for which we have data, broken up between the years before and after the adoption 
of the SGP. If SFAs were random, we would expect them to cluster around the 45-degree 
line, with a roughly even distribution of dots above and below the line, and small 
distances from it. For the years up to 1997, shown in Figure A.3(a), this appears to 
describe the data. While data are missing for some countries, cumulative surpluses are 
uncommon and cumulative deficits are on the whole larger than in later years. 
 ! 14 
Figure A.3.  Cumulative debt changes and deficits in the EU-15, 1990-2007 
 
Notes: Due to missing data, panel (a) covers 1991-1997, except for FRA and ITA (from 1990), DEU (from 1992), and ESP and SWE (from 1995). 
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Figure A.3(b), for the decade after the SGP was adopted, presents a very different picture. 
It is striking that the dots either fall on the 45-degree line or below it: the dominant trend was 
towards positive SFAs (changes in debt exceed recorded deficits). Figure A.3(b) also shows that 
five countries had large negative cumulative deficits (i.e. surpluses) relative to 2007 GDP over 
the period 1998 to 2007: Finland (-28.7%), Denmark (-19.4%), Luxembourg (-16.3%), as well as 
Ireland (-10.8%) and Sweden (-10.7). Finland and Luxembourg in particular used surpluses to 
buy assets rather than to pay off debt. Luxembourg had an average debt to GDP ratio of 6.4% 
over the period 1998 to 2007, practically zero, so surpluses could not go into paying off debt. 
Finland had high deficits and a growing stock of debt until the mid-1990s, but then started to run 
surpluses: between 1998 and 2007, its debt to GDP ratio declined from 48.7% to 35.2%, just 
over half of the EU’s limit and fourth-lowest in the EU-15 countries in that year (after 
Luxembourg, Ireland, and Denmark). Ireland, too, reduced its debt from 53.6% to 25% of GDP 
over the same period, but by less than its cumulative surplus. In contrast, Denmark and Sweden 
had a cumulative SFA of closer to zero over 1998 to 2007, so most of their budget surpluses 
went towards debt reduction. 
We also disaggregate the SFA into its accounting components. As part of its analysis of 
country notifications under the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Eurostat decomposes the SFA into 
items that account for the transition from the deficit to the change in debt (Eurostat 2011). The 
first category relates to the net acquisition of financial assets. This includes currency and 
deposits, securities other than shares, loans, shares and other equity, as well as other financial 
assets that mainly consist of other accounts receivable. A second category comprises adjustments 
due to transactions in liabilities excluded from the Maastricht debt definition, notably financial 
derivatives, and other liabilities that mainly consist of other accounts payable. A third category 
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contains various other adjustments that have to be made to transition the deficit to the change in 
debt. Some of these arise because government debt is measured at face/par/nominal value (the 
amount due when debt has to be repaid) and excludes accrued interest. Hence the SFA is affected 
by issuances above or below nominal value, differences between interest accrued and paid, and 
redemptions of debt above or below nominal value. The appreciation or depreciation of foreign-
currency debt also falls into this category, as do other volume changes due to the reclassification 
of units inside or outside general government, or the disappearance of debt. A final fourth 
category contains statistical discrepancies due to the use of diverse sources, or potential 
problems with data reliability; however, statistical discrepancies are not consistently reported, 
“with some compilers showing discrepancies explicitly, whilst others (for example France) 
allocate them under various other SFA items.”30 
The breakdown of the SFA into its components is summarized below: 
1) Net acquisition of financial assets 
Currency and deposits 
Securities other than shares 
Loans 
Shares and other equity 
Other financial assets 
2) Adjustments 
Net incurrence of liabilities in financial derivatives 
Net incurrence of other liabilities 
Issuances above/below nominal value 
Difference between interest accrued and paid 
Redemptions of debt above/below nominal value 
Appreciation/depreciation of foreign-currency debt 
Changes in sector classification 
Other volume changes in financial liabilities 
3) Statistical discrepancies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Eurostat, Stock/flow Adjustment (SFA) for the Member States, the Euro Area and the EU27 for the Period of 
2007-2010 (Luxembourg: Eurostat, October 2011), p. 13. 
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In the main text, we report results that suggest that two components are important sources 
of gimmicks: the net acquisition of “shares and other equity” and an item called “net incurrence 
of other liabilities” that captures mainly “other accounts payable”.31 Each of these effects goes 
through aggregation (net acquisition of financial assets and total adjustments, respectively) into 
the SFA. 
  “Shares and other equity” transactions become gimmicks when ongoing subsidies are 
treated as equity purchases, placing them “below the line”, out of the deficit calculation. Recall 
the 2002 Portuguese example of subsidies to public enterprises which had been classified as 
equity purchases. As the Director General of Eurostat, Yves Franchet, complained in a letter to 
Pedro Solbes, then EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs: “there is legitimate 
ground for suspicion that at least some of these capital injections should have been treated as 
capital transfers as they were granted to enterprises on a regular basis to cover accumulated 
losses”32  
 Accumulating “other accounts payable” (OAP), goods and services delivered but not yet 
paid for, can make the deficit look better with cash accounting. The EU system of accrual 
accounting achieves this by under-recording at the time of delivery, reducing the reported deficit 
without causing a corresponding reduction in debt when the bills are actually paid. For instance, 
Greek authorities admitted in 2004 that 
“… although the method for recording expenditures was based on deliveries, in 
fact no information on deliveries was ever received by the [National Statistical 
Service of Greece] and the Ministry of Finance since 1997. Therefore most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 More detailed results for these components are reported in Appendix 7. 
32 More recently, Eurostat (op.cit.) estimated the 2011 (an election year) Irish deficit at 13.1% of GDP, up from 
government forecasts of less than 10%, owing to “statistical reclassification” of capital injected into Irish Life & 
Permanent and Allied Irish Banks.  
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military expenditures covered by borrowing were not recorded since the last 7 
years.”33  
As a result of the discrepancy between effective cash payments and the expenditure recorded in 
government accounts, €8.7 billion of additional military expenditure between 1997 and 2003 
were retrospectively imputed in government accounts, averaging 1 percent of GDP per annum. 
The largest discrepancy amounted to 1.9 percent of GDP and occurred in 2000, an election year. 
This under-recording too is regularly detectable in the data. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Eurostat, Report by Eurostat on the Revision of the Greek Government Deficit and Debt Figures (Luxembourg: 
Eurostat, November 22, 2004). 
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Appendix 5. Data definitions, data sources, and summary statistics 
 
Balance: Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) of general government, Excessive Deficit 
Procedure, including one-off proceeds relative to the allocation of mobile phone licenses 
(UMTS), in percent of gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices. Source: Eurostat 
AMECO, series UBLGE.  
 
Banking crisis: Dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country experienced a banking crisis in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. Source: Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, ‘Resolution of Banking Crises: 
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’, IMF Working Paper WP/10/146 (2010). 
 
Boom: Gap between actual and trend GDP at 2000 market prices if the gap is 2.5 or greater, and 
0 otherwise, in percent of trend GDP at market prices. Source: Based on Eurostat AMECO, 
series AVGDGT. 
 
Debt change: Change in general government consolidated gross debt, Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (based on ESA 95), in percent of GDP at market prices. Source: Eurostat AMECO, 
series UDGG. 
 
Electoral term: The number of years left in the government’s current electoral term. Only full 
years are counted. Thus, a zero is scored in an election year, and n-1 in the year after an election, 
where n = length of term. If an early election is held, the count resets before having reached zero. 
Source: Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer and Patrick Walsh, ‘New 
Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions’, World Bank 
Economic Review 15 (2001), pp. 165-76. 
 
Net incurrence of other liabilities: Net incurrence (-) of other liabilities, mainly in the form of 
other accounts payable. Source: Eurostat Government Finance Statistics, series F_LI_OTH. 
 
Net acquisition of shares and other equity: Net acquisition (+) of financial assets in the form of 
shares and other equity, in percent of GDP at market prices. Source: Eurostat Government 
Finance Statistics, series F5. 
 
SFA: Stock-flow adjustment, calculated as Debt change plus Balance. 
 
SGP: Dummy variable for the Stability and Growth Pact, equal to 1 from 1998 onward, and 0 
before. 
 
Slump: Absolute value of the gap between actual and trend GDP at 2000 market prices if the gap 
is negative, and 0 otherwise, in percent of trend GDP at market prices. Source: Based on Eurostat 
AMECO, series AVGDGT. 
 
Transparency: Interpolated index of fiscal transparency, with a theoretical range from 0 (no 
transparency) to 1 (full transparency). Source: See Appendix 2. 
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Table A.2.  Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Balance 219 -2.25 3.35 -11.93 6.84 
Banking crisis 219 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Boom 219 0.50 1.45 0 10.04 
Debt change 219 2.79 4.11 -8.31 23.16 
Electoral term 219 1.68 1.25 0 4 
Net acquisition of shares and other equity 72 -0.33 0.74 -3.60 1.10 
Net incurrence of other liabilities 72 -0.17 0.48 -1.40 1.80 
SFA 219 0.54 3.02 -12.87 11.23 
SGP 219 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Slump 219 0.75 1.26 0.00 7.47 
Transparency 219 0.70 0.11 0.50 0.87 
Note: This information is for the 14-country sample. 
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Appendix 6. Alternative measures of booms 
We distinguish between years of fast growth (boom) and below-trend growth (slump). Boom is 
the gap between actual and trend GDP at 2000 market prices if the gap is 2.5 or greater, and 0 
otherwise, expressed in percent of trend GDP at market prices. Slump is the absolute value of the 
gap between actual and trend GDP at 2000 market prices if the gap is negative, and 0 otherwise, 
expressed in percent of trend GDP at market prices. The data are from Eurostat’s AMECO 
database, series AVGDGT. We experimented with a number of alternative cutoffs for setting the 
boom variable to zero. Figure A.4 below reports results obtained with several alternative 
specifications and replicating the model in column (4) of Table A.3 below. In columns (a), (b) 
and (c), gaps that are smaller than .5%, 1.5% and 3.5% of trend GDP are set to zero, 
respectively, while slumps remain defined as stated above throughout. The pattern of results is 
very similar. The conditional slump effect is always substantively much larger, and the effect of 
a boom, however defined, is indistinguishable from zero for a wide range of the conditioning 
variable, budget transparency. We also experimented with alternative measures of economic 
performance. When we used the gap between actual and potential GDP at 2000 market prices 
instead (again from AMECO, series AVGDGP) to define our boom and slump variables, the 
results were generally weaker in terms of statistical significance but the pattern was consistent. 
The asymmetric effect of booms and slumps, conditional on budget transparency, is very robust. 
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Figure A.4.  Conditional economic cycles in stock-flow adjustments using alternative cutoffs for booms 
 
Note: The results show the marginal effect of boom (row 1) and slump (row 2), conditional on budget transparency, based 
on the model reported in column (4) of Table A.3. The column heading in this figure indicates the relevant cutoff used for 
the boom variable. Greece is excluded from the data. 
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Appendix 7. Main regression results in full 
 
We employ the following empirical specification with countries indexed by i and 
years by t: 
 
 Here, budgetit is the SFA or its components. If the SFA contains gimmicks, we 
should be able to identify components whose patterns match those found for the SFA and 
whose magnitudes exhaust the estimated SFA patterns. If the effects of fiscal rules, 
electoral incentives, and economic conditions are conditional on fiscal transparency, 
higher transparency should displace the incentives to manipulate public finances. Xit 
denotes variables that affect budget outcomes conditional on fiscal transparency, captured 
by the interaction of Xit and our measure of fiscal transparency, BTi. If higher 
transparency makes gimmicks less appealing, we expect ! and " to have opposite signs. 
BTi is indexed by country only, as it is unchanged over the period we consider. Zit 
contains any variables not conditional on fiscal transparency. Our fiscal transparency 
measure is time invariant, hence it is subsumed in a country’s fixed effect, . Finally,  
captures year fixed effects34 and  is an error term. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. Our principal specification is for 14 EU countries (6 for the components; 
no transparency data for Luxembourg) for 1990-2007. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 We drop one year fixed effect to accommodate estimating the coefficient on SGP. 
' ' 'it it it i it i t itbudget X X BT Z! " # $ % & '= + + + + + +
i! t!
it!
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Table A.3.  How budget transparency affects fiscal outcomes and fiscal gimmicks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable  Balance Debt change SFA SFA 
Net acquisition (+) 
of shares and other 
equity 
Net incurrence (-) 
of other liabilities 
Electoral term 0.84 -3.84 -3.00 -2.22 -1.79 -0.75 
 (0.21)*** (0.90)*** (0.83)*** (0.52)*** (0.22)*** (0.19)** 
Electoral term ! Budget transparency -0.95 4.88 3.93 2.92 2.32 1.02 
 (0.27)*** (1.28)*** (1.17)*** (0.74)*** (0.31)*** (0.24)*** 
SGP 12.63 -2.03 10.60 11.91 7.19 -1.38 
 (3.08)*** (5.83) (3.26)*** (4.40)** (2.04)** (1.08) 
SGP ! Budget transparency -10.81 -2.02 -12.82 -14.57 -8.30 1.77 
 (3.14)*** (6.10) (3.70)*** (5.98)** (2.47)** (1.46) 
Slump 4.00 0.68 4.68 4.81 1.67 -0.54 
 (0.61)*** (1.37) (1.36)*** (2.36)* (0.76)* (0.67) 
Slump ! Budget transparency -6.21 -0.42 -6.63 -6.74 -2.29 1.04 
 (0.83)*** (1.89) (1.79)*** (3.15)* (1.00)* (0.90) 
Boom -0.64 1.62 0.98 0.78 -0.02 0.25 
 (0.43) (0.53)*** (0.45)** (0.94) (0.41) (0.52) 
Boom ! Budget transparency 1.11 -2.62 -1.51 -1.19 -0.05 -0.28 
 (0.68) (0.69)*** (0.68)** (1.36) (0.63) (0.70) 
Banking crisis -2.85 3.79 0.94 0.57 -0.09 0.67 
 (0.49)*** (1.32)** (1.42) (1.43) (0.59) (0.49) 
Observations 219 219 219 203 77 77 
Countries 14 14 14 13 6 6 
Sample excludes LUX LUX LUX GRC, LUX 
AUT, DNK, FIN, 
GER, GRC, IRL, 
ITA, LUX, SWE 
AUT, DNK, FIN, 
GER, GRC, IRL, 
ITA, LUX, SWE 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.72 0.38 0.10 0.04 0.42 0.33 
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variables are expressed as per cent of GDP. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Without budget transparency (row 1), the number of years left in the current electoral 
term significantly predicts gimmickry. As elections near, balances shrink (column 1) but 
changes in debt increase by more (column 2), so the SFA is bigger (column 3), as long as 
less transparent circumstances allow misrepresentation of the true fiscal situation. 
Moreover, the electoral cycle is evident (though a little, but not significantly, smaller) 
without Greece (column 4). What produced it? Abuse of accounting for subsidies as share 
purchases (column 5) and under-recording of deliveries (column 6) stand out among all 
the SFA components we reviewed. But (row 2) increasing transparency reduces these 
practices. 
Moreover, the table shows that, again in non-transparent environments (row 3), 
the SGP increased balances (i.e., reduced deficits) but had no effect on debt change. The 
SFA results consequently reflect this enhancement of the fiscal balance (column 3) and 
are again little affected by omitting Greece (column 4). Despite the fact that few of our 
77 observations in this case are from before the SGP, column 5 shows that misusing 
equities to disguise subsidies and thus deficits, via the SFA, was significant. All these 
results (row 4) are absent where fiscal transparency is greater. 
As the next four rows of Table 1 show, without transparency slumps (growth 
below trend) increase the SFA, while booms (growth well above trend) have a much 
smaller effect that is not robust to the exclusion of Greece from the sample (column 4). 
This also shows in the absence of any unusual boom effect on the equities component 
(column 5) as well as the smaller (and jointly insignificant) effect of booms on the SFA 
depicted in Figure 1, panel (f). 
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Finally, the presence of a banking crisis affects deficits (bigger) and debt change 
(bigger) but has no effect on gimmicks in more and less transparent countries alike. It 
may well be that a crisis increases attention and scrutiny in ways similar to the effect of 
transparency on the probability of detection and consequent value of the strategy. 
Visual inspection of the residuals plotted in Figure A.5 suggests little 
heteroskedasticity across countries. This also shows that forecasts from the model 
estimated through 2007 miss 2008 on average but are back on track by 2009, giving us 
some confidence that 2008 was not a total structural break. 
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Figure A.5.  Residuals and forecast errors 
 
Note: The graph is based on the results reported in column (3) of Table A.3. 
 
* *
* Data for these years are based on forecast errors
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Appendix 8.  Robustness analysis 
We carry out a large number of robustness tests, varying (i) the dependent variable 
(deficits, debt change, and all other SFA components); (ii) subsets of data, excluding and 
including various combinations of countries and extending the sample to all EU 
countries; (iii) other explanatory variables, both political (type and ideology of 
governments) and economic (banking crisis, alternate measures of boom and slump); (iv) 
alternate measures, codings, imputations, and specifications of transparency, including 
the European Commission’s fiscal rules index, IMF domestic fiscal rules data, and fiscal 
targets data, among others, and adding a lagged dependent variable to every specification. 
 (i) Dependent variables.  We repeat our specification for all the other SFA 
components listed in Appendix 3. None of the other subcomponents gives significant 
results for the electoral cycle, as summarized in Table A.4. The electoral cycle effect on 
the SFA is driven by the net acquisition of shares and other equity, which in turn drives 
the result obtained for the net acquisition of financial assets. For the various adjustments 
affecting the SFA that we discussed in Appendix 3, the electoral effect is driven by the 
net incurrence of other liabilities, which consists principally of other accounts payable. 
This in turn filters through into an effect on total adjustments. However, the net 
acquisition of shares and other equity plays a substantively larger role in producing 
electoral cycles in the SFA.
 ! 29 
 
Table A.4.  Conditional electoral cycles in SFA subcomponents 
Dependent variable Electoral term Std. Error 
Electoral term 
! budget 
transparency 
Std. Error Observations 
SFA -2.89 (0.29)*** 3.82 (0.56)*** 77 
1) Net acquisition of financial assets -2.31 (0.14)*** 2.90 (0.26)*** 77 
     Currency and deposits -0.43 (0.26) 0.56 (0.36) 77 
     Securities other than shares 0.03 (0.11) -0.04 (0.14) 77 
     Loans -0.29 (0.24) 0.40 (0.31) 77 
     Shares and other equity -1.79 (0.22)*** 2.32 (0.31)*** 77 
     Other financial assets 0.15 (0.24) -0.30 (0.36) 77 
2) Adjustments -0.65 (0.16)*** 0.90 (0.23)** 77 
     Net incurrence of liabilities in financial derivatives - - - - - 
     Net incurrence of other liabilities -0.75 (0.19)** 1.02 (0.24)*** 77 
     Issuances above/below nominal value -0.22 (0.18) 0.29 (0.24) 69 
     Difference between interest accrued and paid 0.25 (0.13) -0.35 (0.17)* 77 
     Redemptions of debt above/below nominal value 0.08 (0.15) -0.12 (0.21) 65 
     Appreciation/depreciation of foreign-currency debt -0.01 (0.06) 0.03 (0.07) 75 
     Changes in sector classification 0.08 (0.18) -0.09 (0.24) 69 
     Other volume changes in financial liabilities -0.01 (0.07) 0.01 (0.11) 74 
3) Statistical discrepancies -0.04 (0.12) 0.13 (0.18) 74 
Notes: All results are based on data from Eurostat Government Finance Statistics, which for our sample are available for six countries (Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK). The table reports regressions for the main and detailed subcomponents of the SFA as described in Appendix 3. Results 
for the net incurrence of liabilities in financial derivatives are not available, since these figures are reported as either zero or missing for our sample. We only 
report the coefficients on the electoral term variable and its interaction with our measure of budget transparency, but the models are identical throughout and as 
specified for the subcomponent regressions reported in columns 5 and 6 of the table in the main paper. 
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(ii) Subsets. Second, we limit the sample to observations exceeding the deficit 
limit of 3% of GDP, since binding fiscal rules could increase incentives to resort to 
gimmickry. Despite omitting more than half of our observations, the pattern of results in 
Table A.5 is remarkably stable (though of course standard errors are larger). As expected, 
the magnitude of the coefficients on SGP and its interaction term increases, but not by a 
large amount. Removing the “cumulative surplus” countries with positive SFAs in Figure 
A.3(b), column 2 reports SFAs in a sample of ten countries excluding Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, and Sweden. Despite dropping four countries and 30% of observations, the core 
results are qualitatively identical to those in Table A.3. Nor does the exact choice of 
countries to omit matter: we omitted each of the four countries separately, in pairs, and 
three at a time, and while individual coefficients can vary by as much as 10%, the overall 
pattern is very much the same. 
Column 3 repeats the SFA specification for the eleven Eurozone countries: the 
main results remain evident. Column 4 presents estimates for a larger sample of countries 
adding to the 14 countries all the remaining EU members except Malta for the years in 
which they were EU members. The results remain similar to those of Table A.3. 
However, these eleven extra countries only added 32 data points, so we suggest not 
making too much of these differences. The only inconsistent effect across these four 
samples is for banking crises. This is due to the small number of observations with such 
crises in the core 14-country sample, preceding the global economic crisis: just five. 
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Table A.5.  Further sample restrictions and expansions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable SFA SFA SFA SFA SFA 
Electoral term -3.19 -2.76 -3.37 -1.77 -3.18 
 (1.11)** (1.15)** (1.00)*** (0.83)** (0.95)*** 
Electoral term ! Budget transparency 4.09 3.44 4.55 2.19 4.35 
 (1.73)** (1.63)* (1.43)*** (1.19)* (1.36)*** 
SGP 11.61 10.97 9.59 10.65 6.10 
 (6.52) (3.03)*** (2.76)*** (3.05)*** (2.21)** 
SGP ! Budget transparency -15.73 -12.82 -10.61 -12.70 -9.16 
 (5.21)** (2.99)*** (2.91)*** (3.41)*** (3.30)** 
Slump 6.07 3.70 3.83 4.63 3.74 
 (1.42)*** (1.07)*** (1.44)** (1.19)*** (1.53)** 
Slump ! Budget transparency -8.87 -6.01 -5.89 -6.78 -5.28 
 (1.60)*** (1.47)*** (2.25)** (1.67)*** (2.29)* 
Boom -2.88 0.62 0.58 0.15 1.16 
 (4.72) (0.44) (0.72) (0.30) (0.55)* 
Boom ! Budget transparency 5.40 -1.01 -1.04 -0.22 -1.72 
 (9.00) (0.72) (1.16) (0.50) (0.78)** 
Banking crisis 7.64 -3.06 3.39 -3.71 0.05 
 (3.30)** (1.43)* (2.04) (0.76)*** (1.37) 
Observations 90 159 175 251 255 
Countries 13 10 11 25 15 
Sample description Deficit > 3% 
Excl. DNK, 
FIN, IRL, 
SWE 
Eurozone EU-27 except LUX, MLT 
EU-15 
(Amelia) 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.10 
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variables are expressed as per cent of GDP. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. In column 
(5), the regression also includes a lagged dependent variable (coefficient = 0.06, standard error = 0.07) and boom is alternatively defined as equal to 
the deviation from trend growth if that deviation is positive, 0 otherwise. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table A.6.  Main regressions, augmented with lagged dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable  Balance Debt change SFA SFA 
Net acquisition (+) 
of shares and other 
equity 
Net incurrence (-) 
of other liabilities 
Lagged dependent variable 0.59 0.04 0.08 0.13 -0.06 -0.12 
 (0.06)*** (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)** (0.22) (0.10) 
Electoral term 0.60 -3.89 -3.12 -2.20 -1.81 -0.93 
 (0.28)* (0.94)*** (0.87)*** (0.49)*** (0.35)*** (0.17)*** 
Electoral term × Budget transparency -0.55 4.95 4.11 2.91 2.45 1.27 
 (0.38) (1.33)*** (1.21)*** (0.71)*** (0.52)*** (0.23)*** 
SGP 5.15 -1.62 10.40 11.60 11.06 -0.03 
 (1.07)*** (6.26) (3.20)*** (4.19)** (5.52) (0.85) 
SGP × Budget transparency -3.89 -2.38 -12.62 -14.28 -13.11 0.16 
 (0.88)*** (6.33) (3.57)*** (5.65)** (6.38)* (1.16) 
Slump 1.74 0.82 4.65 4.74 2.95 0.16 
 (0.53)*** (1.47) (1.26)*** (2.15)** (1.77) (0.60) 
Slump × Budget transparency -2.73 -0.63 -6.57 -6.61 -3.92 0.17 
 (0.75)*** (2.03) (1.65)*** (2.86)** (2.31) (0.86) 
Boom -0.52 1.54 0.85 0.61 0.08 0.29 
 (0.28)* (0.64)** (0.47)* (0.95) (0.51) (0.58) 
Boom × Budget transparency 0.77 -2.50 -1.34 -0.95 -0.21 -0.37 
 (0.45) (0.85)** (0.72)* (1.37) (0.80) (0.79) 
Banking crisis -1.87 3.60 0.72 0.16 0.19 0.82 
 (0.56)*** (1.56)** (1.42) (1.37) (0.84) (0.53) 
Observations 219 219 219 203 72 72 
Countries 14 14 14 13 6 6 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 0.37 0.10 0.06 0.47 0.34 
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variables are expressed as per cent of GDP. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A.7.  Main regressions, augmented with party political variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable  Balance Debt change SFA SFA 
Net acquisition (+) 
of shares and other 
equity 
Net incurrence (-) 
of other liabilities 
Prime minister from a left party -0.66 -0.49 -1.14 -0.98 0.34 -0.17 
 (0.35)* (0.61) (0.64)* (0.66) (0.20) (0.08)* 
Coalition government -1.95 0.62 -1.33 -1.62 -0.27 -0.05 
 (0.52)*** (1.10) (1.30) (1.42) (0.13)* (0.17) 
Electoral term 0.62 -3.63 -3.02 -2.27 -1.92 -0.73 
 (0.23)** (0.80)*** (0.78)*** (0.54)*** (0.22)*** (0.18)** 
Electoral term × Budget transparency -0.67 4.62 3.95 2.96 2.48 0.99 
 (0.30)** (1.16)*** (1.11)*** (0.76)*** (0.32)*** (0.24)*** 
SGP 10.19 -1.16 9.03 10.33 9.74 -2.10 
 (2.22)*** (6.56) (5.20) (6.56) (2.98)** (1.15) 
SGP × Budget transparency -8.75 -3.12 -11.87 -13.69 -11.38 2.63 
 (2.56)*** (6.16) (4.76)** (7.11)* (3.74)** (1.54) 
Slump 4.32 1.13 5.45 5.77 2.41 -0.70 
 (0.84)*** (1.40) (1.46)*** (2.49)** (1.22) (0.86) 
Slump × Budget transparency -6.72 -1.10 -7.82 -8.18 -3.20 1.22 
 (1.25)*** (1.99) (2.06)*** (3.46)** (1.56)* (1.12) 
Boom -0.82 1.71 0.89 0.90 -0.31 0.33 
 (0.43)* (0.45)*** (0.48)* (1.11) (0.30) (0.50) 
Boom × Budget transparency 1.34 -2.73 -1.38 -1.36 0.31 -0.39 
 (0.69)* (0.56)*** (0.67)* (1.54) (0.48) (0.68) 
Banking crisis -2.86 3.90 1.04 0.71 -0.23 0.74 
 (0.44)*** (1.27)*** (1.25) (1.32) (0.48) (0.45) 
Observations 219 219 219 203 77 77 
Countries 14 14 14 13 6 6 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.38 0.12 0.07 0.45 0.32 
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variables are expressed as per cent of GDP. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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 (iii) Other explanatory variables. Table A.6 reports results when our main 
regressions are augmented with a lagged dependent variable. It is sometimes statistically 
significant in the case of the deficit, but never for debt change and only once for the SFA, 
nor does including it alter any interpretation we make in this paper. 
The forecasting errors literature includes political variables like government 
ideology (left/right) and type of government (coalition/majoritarian), with no clear 
effects.35 We use the Database of Political Institutions to define two simple indicators of 
the ideology of the prime minister and of coalition government and use these to augment 
our main regression models.36 Table A.7 shows that coalition government has a strong 
negative effect on the budget balance, and there are some further weakly significant 
effects, but no significant alterations in our results reported above. 
Additionally, we perform the same sort of analysis of other measures of fiscal 
rules and targets, including some that have time variation. These include the EC fiscal 
rules index, an IMF indicator of the existence of domestic fiscal rules based on IMF data, 
and Hallerberg et al.’s37 fiscal targets data. None of these produce significant results, 
though with the IMF data the results are qualitatively similar to our SGP pattern: omitting 
SGP yields significant results for the domestic fiscal rule indicator, suggesting that it is 
indeed the SGP component or enforcement of national rules that matters.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Brück and Stephan, ‘Do Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?’, pp. 11-13; 
and Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori, and Peter Wierts, ‘Planning to Cheat: EU Fiscal Policy in Real 
Time’, Economic Policy 24 (2009), p. 777. 
36 Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer and Patrick Walsh, ‘New Tools in 
Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions’, World Bank Economic Review 15 
(2001), pp. 165-76. Our indicator for a prime minister from a left party is set to 1 when EXECRLC has a 
score of 3, and 0 otherwise. Our indicator for coalition government is set to 1 when GOV2SEAT shows a 
second government party with seats in the legislature, and 0 otherwise. 
37 Mark Hallerberg, Rolf Strauch and Jürgen von Hagen, Fiscal Governance in Europe (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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Second, we replace our continuous measure of transparency with a three-valued 
coding to define the interactions: high (Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, UK), 
medium (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland), and low (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain). Linearity seems to be a reasonable assumption for electoral cycles, but 
for the SGP and slump, the effects are driven by the least transparent countries. Figure 
A.6 summarizes this result. Finally, as an alternative method to our imputation procedure, 
we employ Amelia38 to generate average effects across multiple imputed datasets for the 
main SFA model. Qualitatively, as Table A.5, column 5 shows, signs and statistical 
significance survive this experiment. Overall, we remain confident in the main results we 
report.  
(iv) Alternative specification. von Hagen and Wolff39 argue that the covariance 
between stock-flow adjustments and the deficit shows that “the introduction of the fiscal 
rule led governments to systematically [emphasis added] use stock-flow adjustments to 
lower deficits”, that is, the effect of the rule was not conditional on domestic institutional 
transparency. We replicate their model both with conventional regression and GMM 
methods and find that, compared to the published version, the estimates of the key 
quantity of interest are less statistically significant when standard errors are not robust or 
clustered (analysis available from authors on request). This strengthens our confidence in 
our result that the effect of introducing the SGP rules was indeed conditional on 
transparency. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Honaker, King and Blackwell, ‘Amelia II’. 
39 von Hagen and Wolff, ‘What Do Deficits Tell Us About Debt?’, p. 3270. 
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Figure A.6.  Marginal effects on SFA, conditional on budget transparency tertile 
 
Notes: Dots display marginal effects on SFAs (in % of GDP) conditional on tertiles of budget transparency 
of (a) years left in the electoral term, (b) the SGP, (c) slump, and (d) boom. These are from a model like 
that in column (3), Table A.3, but with conditioning interactions based on three clusters of budget 
transparency according to the ranking in Figure A.1: high (Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, UK), 
medium (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland), and low (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain). Greece 
is included in the data. The lines indicate 10% confidence intervals. 
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